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Introduction  
Measuring the impact of violence is fraught with problems, not least because of the 
definitional problems around what constitutes violence and how this might be 
quantified. If one considers violence perpetrated by paramilitaries in Northern Ireland 
or vigilante groups in South Africa then the task becomes even more difficult. This 
chapter will examine methodological problems associated with gaining access to, and 
undertaking research in, the dangerous arena of paramilitary violence in Northern 
Ireland and vigilante violence in South Africa. It will consider the difficulties in 
obtaining reliable information on the levels of violence particularly from official 
police sources, and the way in which this type of crime is classified. Other statistical 
sources such as pressure group data will be examined and problems highlighted with 
the use of documentation gleaned from tendentious organisations. Data about the 
impact of violence from primary research are also fraught with problems. Victims, for 
example, can be reluctant interviewees for fear of paramilitary/vigilante reprisal. A 
‘victim’ of paramilitary/vigilante ‘punishment’ may be an erstwhile perpetrator of 
violence. Should one treat internecine turf wars between paramilitaries in Northern 
Ireland in a similar way to violence meted out in pursuit of their political goals? These 
and other issues make the measurement of the impact of violence difficult 
methodological questions. This chapter will therefore highlight these problems and 
examine how we managed them within this study of intra-communal violence. 
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The research context 
South Africa 
South Africa and, more tentatively, Northern Ireland are emerging from bitter ethno-
national conflicts in which violence and crime characterised the transition to peaceful 
political settlements. The collapse of apartheid in 1989, lifting the 30-year ban on the 
African National Congress (ANC) and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela, 
created a climate for political negotiation and change in South Africa. This paved the 
way for an interim constitution, the first multi-racial democratic elections in 1994 and 
led to the Government of National Unity.  The ANC’s success in the June 1999 
elections gave the party an overwhelming mandate to accelerate Thabo Mbeki’s 
programme of ‘transformation’ aimed at tackling the significant socio-economic 
problems facing South Africa: unemployment, AIDS, crime and education. The 
legacy of political resistance, often violent, deployed to make the townships 
ungovernable during apartheid has created a culture tolerant of citizens taking the law 
into their own hands. Although the number of political killings dropped sharply from 
about 2,500 in 1994 to fewer than 240 in 1999 (South African Institute for Race 
Relations 2000), Mbeki in his inauguration speech regretted that some South Africans 
were ‘forced to beg, rob and murder to ensure that they and their own do not perish 
from hunger’. This is reflected in a rising tide of other kinds of violent crimes. Rape, 
car-jacking, serious assault, housebreaking and common robbery, have been 
increasing since 1996, and the trend has been sharply upwards since 1998. About a 
third of all reported violent crimes in 1999 were violent, and the number increased by 
over 9 per cent on 1998.  The savagery of the crime wave is captured in reports that 
one in every two South African women will be raped during their lifetime, the 
average South African is eight times more likely to be murdered than the average 
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American, and one policeman is killed each day - 1,400 have died since the ANC 
came to power (Weekly Mail and Guardian 2000). Accordingly, the public response is 
that ‘brutality should be met with brutality. The rich surround themselves with razor 
wire and private security guards, and the poor resort to vigilantism’ (The Economist 
1999: 23).  
 
Vigilantism is undertaken by organised groups such as Mapogo a Mathamaga
2
 in the 
Northern Province, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
3
 (PAGAD) and the 
Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency
4
 (PEACA) in the Western Cape. In addition, taxi 
associations in some townships have become involved in ‘crime solving’ for a fee. All 
of these groups stand accused of using corporal punishment and violence in 
responding to crime. Indeed Mapogo’s leader, John Magolego asserts that public 
flogging, ‘is the African way of stopping crime. The criminal must lie on the ground, 
and we must work on his buttocks and put him right’ (Quoted in Soggot and Ngobeni 
1999). Alleged suspects are usually beaten until they confess or provide information as 
to the whereabouts of stolen goods or moneys.  Mapogo has also been accused of 
throwing suspects into crocodile-infested waters, while taxi-drivers in Guguletu (a 
                                                          
2
 Mapogo a Mathamaga was established in 1996 and has some 50,000 members who 
pay a monthly subscription to the organisation in return for protection against crime. 
3
 PAGAD was formed towards the end of 1995 and targets drug dealers and 
gangsters. Between March and July 1998 they targeted 86 alleged drug dealers and 
succeeded in killing 24. 
4
 PEACA is based in Khayelitsha, a township near Cape Town. It was established in 
August 1998 by ex-combatants of the liberation struggle who came together to fight 
crime and its members number 1,500. 
 5 
township in Cape Town) are implicated in dragging alleged criminals behind vehicles. 
Further to its crime solving activities, Mapogo has moved into the area of crime 
prevention by offering services usually provided by private security firms such as the 
protection of property and patrolling; takers have included schools and churches.  
 
Furthermore, in some cases spontaneous mobs form to mete out justice to alleged 
criminals. In some instances, those present convene kangaroo courts
5
 but this is not 
always the case. The justice meted out is often of an extremely brutal nature and 
deaths are common. Examples in the townships include the stoning to death of three 
youths found stealing chairs from a church in Pimville, Soweto (Khangale 2001); the 
severe beating of an alleged rapist by women in Chatsworth (Durban) (Williams 1999) 
and the near necklacing
6
 of a man accused of armed robbery in Orange Farm 
(Johannesburg) (Ndaba 2001). In some cases, members of a suspected criminal’s 
family or the family home are targeted. Their houses are either destroyed or burnt and 
often the families subsequently leave the area as a result of intimidation (Ntabazalila 
1997 and interview with the mother of an alleged rapist and murderer, November 
1999). In February 1997, the mother of an alleged criminal was stoned to death for the 
deeds of her son by a crowd of 4,000 in the township of Mamelodi, near Pretoria 
(Amupadhi 1997).  
 
Northern Ireland 
                                                          
5
 Kangaroo courts are characterised by the assumed guilt of the accused, denial of due 
process and instant punishments, usually violent in nature. 
6
 Necklacing involves placing a petrol-filled tyre around the victim’s neck which is 
then set alight. 
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Northern Ireland’s transition to ‘peace’ has been more recent and capricious. The 
signing of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998 and its subsequent endorsement in 
referenda by its electorate (71.2 per cent) and voters in the Irish Republic (94 per 
cent) heralded a political solution to the seemingly intractable problems that 
bedevilled the province for 30 years. The British and Irish Governments formally 
resolved their historical differences through the general and mutual acceptance of the 
principle of consent – Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, and will 
remain so, as long as the majority wishes. Signatories to the Agreement affirmed their 
‘total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of 
resolving differences’. This has created the impression that violence has been 
eschewed in Northern Ireland. Over four years later the evidence suggests this is far 
from true. It is the case that the worst manifestations of the conflict, sectarian killings 
and bombings, are declining. In 1999/2000, for example, seven civilians were 
murdered, the lowest figures since the ‘Troubles’ began, and the first year that there 
were no security force fatalities (Royal Ulster Constabulary
7
 2000). This, however, 
ignores an insidious and ongoing level of paramilitary violence inflicted on working-
class communities referred to as ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings or the informal 
criminal justice system. Paramilitary groups see themselves as community protectors; 
their actions aimed ostensibly at maintaining ‘law and order’ through tackling petty 
crime such as car theft, joyriding
8
, burglary and drug dealing. Up to the end of 2001 
                                                          
7
 On 4
th
 November 2001, as part of the policing reform process, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary changed it name to the Police Service of Northern Ireland. 
8
 Joyriding is a term used, somewhat perversely, to describe the theft of cars 
subsequently used for reckless, high-speed chases usually by teenage boys in urban 
areas. It has resulted in a number of fatalities and serious injuries.  
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Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) statistics show that there have been 2,564 
shootings (an average of 88 per year) and 1,802 beatings (an average of 90 per year) 
since 1973 and 1982 respectively, when figures were first recorded
9
.  
 
Paramilitaries exact community ‘justice’ using baseball bats, hammers, hockey and 
hurley sticks, iron bars, pickaxe handles and steel rods. Other forms of ‘punishment’ 
include dropping heavy concrete blocks on limbs and using power tools on bones. 
Surgeons in the fracture clinic at the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast, for example, 
report that ‘following the cessation of violence there has been an increase in the level 
of injuries occurring in those undergoing paramilitary punishment’ (Nolan et al. 1999: 
8). Their study of treating victims showed that those who had been shot with pistols, 
resulting in open injuries, suffered much less damage to soft tissue and bones than 
those who had been beaten. The brutal reality is that it is ‘better’ to be shot than 
beaten. 
 
Informal criminal ‘justice’ and vigilantism 
Three principal reasons are advanced for the existence of the informal criminal justice 
system in Northern Ireland and vigilantism in South Africa (Knox, 2002). First, in 
both countries there is an absence of an adequate policing service. In Northern 
Ireland, particularly in republican areas, the Police Service for Northern Ireland has 
no legitimacy, and their communities would not normally involve the police in 
dealing with crime in their areas. Republicans claim that the PSNI are prepared to 
tolerate at best, or encourage at worst, crime in their communities as a way of 
                                                          
9
 The figures show that loyalists were responsible for 44.5 per cent of the shootings 
and 47 per cent of the beatings, republicans carried out the remainder. 
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undermining the ‘republican struggle’. Police are therefore willing to ‘trade’ dropping 
charges of joyriding, drug dealing or burglary in return for low-level intelligence 
gathering on so-called known republicans. In loyalist areas, objections to involving 
the police are more to do with keeping the PSNI out of communities where drug 
dealing, racketeering and illegal drinking dens and clubs are commonplace. In South 
Africa, the police are seen as ineffective, lacking not only basic literacy skills but with 
an estimated 25 per cent of its members unable to read and write (Randall 2000). 
Their crime solving capabilities are also unimpressive not least because experienced 
personnel were trained in the policing methods of the old apartheid regime. For 
example, of the 2.2m crimes reported to the police in 1998, almost half were 
considered ‘undetected’ because evidence was insufficient or the suspect had 
disappeared. Half a million more were withdrawn, leaving 524,000 cases that reached 
court (The Economist 2001).  
 
Second, in Northern Ireland there is a rising level of crime including ‘anti-social 
behaviour’, petty and violent crime. This is evidenced in crime and victimisation 
statistics, which show that those from an unskilled social class background are most 
vulnerable and feel their quality of life is particularly affected by fear of crime 
(Northern Ireland Office 2000; Louw and Shaw 1997). In 1998/99 the number of 
violent crimes (defined as offences against the person, sexual offences and robberies) 
increased by 21.2 per cent (to 21,452) and by a further 12.6 per cent in 1999/00 (PSNI 
2000: 75). A Home Office report on international crime statistics showed Northern 
Ireland’s percentage increase in recorded crime (28 per cent) as second only to South 
Africa where it rose by 37 per cent in 1998 (Barclay and Tavares 2000: 3).  In the 
absence, therefore, of an adequate/legitimate police service and/or because people are 
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discouraged from seeking police involvement, some people in communities turn to 
paramilitaries or vigilantes to secure a prompt, visible and effective response to crime 
in their areas. Hence, a proportion of local people living in fear of crime endorse 
paramilitary ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings and vigilante stoning or 
sjambokking (whipping) of alleged criminals or ‘anti-social’ elements.  
 
Third, the formal criminal justice system within both countries is perceived as slow, 
ineffectual, and soft on crime.  The view of a focus group participant in a loyalist 
community illustrates this: 
 
I know young lads who were put on probation for stealing cars. The first week 
they went to the Probation Board they talked about the consequences of their 
actions for victims. The next week they were taken go-karting, then deep-sea 
fishing. The average mother cannot afford to send her kids to these activities. I 
then heard one young fella who hadn’t been involved in crime ask ‘how do you 
join the probation club for week-ends away?’ People see these young lads who 
have committed quite serious crime being taken by the hand without 
punishment for their actions against the community. 
(Interview with focus group, Shankill – Belfast, November 1999) 
 
The formal justice system is not only perceived as failing the victims of crime but also 
those involved in criminal activities. The case of Brian Connolly, a deceased joyrider 
provides an example of this failure of the formal system of justice. Brian was a 
passenger in a stolen car (allegedly travelling at 100mph) that crashed into the family 
car of Charmaine and Justin Watson killing the young couple in July 1999 and 
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orphaning their two children. Brian’s mother believes the formal system let her son 
down badly in that if he ‘got into trouble, he never seemed to be really punished. He’d 
often get bail or maybe just a three-month sentence. He also became very good at 
working the system. He knew what he’d get away with’ (Carmel Donnelly quoted in 
Walker 1999: 5) and had 109 prior convictions, many of them for motoring offences 
(Harper 2001). South Africa’s criminal justice system can also be said to be under-
performing in that, on average, fewer than 9 per cent of recorded crime result in the 
conviction of the perpetrators. For more serious offences the conviction rate is even 
lower. For example, in 1999 the rate for car hijacking was 2 per cent, aggravated 
robbery 3 per cent and rapes 8 per cent (Schönteich and Louw 2001). Thus in 
societies where violent conflict has been the norm, it is not surprising that the time 
taken to process offenders, the necessary safeguards in the legal system, and the 
standard of proof required for conviction is seen as no match for summary justice 
meted out by paramilitaries and vigilantes. 
 
Researching paramilitary violence and vigilantism 
Commentaries on political violence in Northern Ireland and South Africa concentrate 
on two broad levels – firstly, trying to establish the facts or data about the levels, 
distribution and sources of violence (Murray 1982; Poole 1993; Fay et al. 1999; 
Coleman 1998; Minnaar et al. 1998; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998; and 
Jeffrey 1997) and secondly, examining the causes of, or motivation for, violence 
(White 1993; O’Duffy 1995; Patel 1997; and Bornmann 1998). What is largely 
absent, however, is research on the nature of the relationship between paramilitary or 
vigilante groups and the communities over which they exert social control. Kennedy, 
for example, points out that although the ‘brute facts of communal violence are well 
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known...what is less well known is the degree of ‘internal’ paramilitary repression (in 
the form of beatings, shootings and mutilations) which developed in the shadows of 
the larger conflict’ (Kennedy 1995: 67). The same can also be said of our 
understanding of vigilantism in South Africa. 
 
There are, however, exceptions including Cavanaugh’s (1997) ethnographic study 
undertaken in loyalist and republican communities in Belfast and Brewer et al. (1998) 
study of the role played by local communities in civil unrest and crime management. 
In terms of post-apartheid South Africa, much of the literature deals with popular 
justice or community courts (utilising non-violent methods of punishment such as 
community service) as opposed to vigilantism or kangaroo courts. Examples would 
include the work of Nina (1995) and his examination of popular justice and civil 
society, especially within the context of street committees in Guguletu (Cape Town), 
and the work of Schärf (1992), which explores how best community courts can be 
adapted to the formal justice system.  
 
These issues combined to frame the research upon which this chapter is based. Our 
discussions here centre on methodological conundrums associated with conducing 
qualitative research involving victims of ‘punishment’ beatings (n = forty), focus 
groups within communities (n = four)  ‘controlled’ by the paramilitaries in Northern 
Ireland, victims of vigilante attacks (n = six) and focus groups within communities (n 
= six) where vigilantes operate in South Africa. Of the four focus groups conducted in 
Northern Ireland, two took place in loyalist areas and two in republican areas. 
Furthermore, an area containing a restorative justice project was chosen and an area 
without such a project (one of each in a loyalist and republican area respectively). 
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This allowed for comparisons to be made at inter and intra-community levels. We 
offer these personal reflections on researching paramilitary and vigilante violence  in 
the hope that they have lessons for those undertaking ‘sensitive fieldwork’ elsewhere. 
We are mindful of Brewer’s conclusions on police research in Northern Ireland. He 
argued that sensitivity is highly situational and researchers need to consider ‘what 
they believe to be controversial and sensitive but also what their respondents, 
potential gatekeepers, and the community at large might consider to be sensitive about 
the research’ (Brewer 1993: 143). Similarly, Alty and Rodham (1998) suggest that 
research within sensitive areas requires flexibility and demands practical solutions 
that are not always linked to traditionally recognised ethical dilemmas. We consider 
these issues in no particular priority under four key headings: reliable and valid 
information, accessing victims, personal security, and dissemination and engagement 
with stakeholders. 
 
The search for reliable and valid information on violence 
In Northern Ireland the PSNI collates statistics on the number of paramilitary-style 
shootings and assaults that are reported to them. These statistics are thought to 
underestimate the magnitude of the problem by as much as 30-50 per cent, according 
to one former pressure group (Families Against Intimidation and Terror - FAIT), not 
least because those who have been subjected to beatings are reluctant to go to the 
police through fear of reprisal. There is also no information available on charges 
brought against perpetrators. Detection rates are subsumed within ‘violence against 
 13 
the person’ statistics but are described by the Police Authority for Northern Ireland10 
(PANI) as ‘relatively low’. 
 
Other statistical sources collated by pressure groups such as the former FAIT and the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Bureau (NIHRB) are also problematic. FAIT was 
formed in 1990 by individuals affected or concerned by the continuation of 
‘punishment’ attacks on those allegedly involved in ‘anti-social behaviour’ or petty 
crime. The organisation self-described as anti-sectarian and non-political, sought to 
‘heighten political and public awareness of intimidation and mutilation within 
Northern Ireland’s controlled communities, to provide support for primary and 
secondary victims, and to speak-out on behalf of those unable or afraid to voice their 
own objections’ (FAIT 1999: 1). As part of its activities it established a database on 
paramilitary violence including ‘punishment’ beatings, shootings, intimidation, 
exiling and petrol bombings. Its figures for the number of shootings and beatings 
however were obtained from the PSNI, merely replicating the official statistics. On 
examination of the database we were able to obtain it is not clear from the data if any 
distinction was made between ‘punishment’ and other sectarian or racial attacks. The 
numbers of individuals exiled or intimidated out of their homes, as counted by FAIT, 
show a total number of people forced to be re-housed. The organisation counted each 
person in a household as an individual exiled or intimidated. A family of four 
                                                          
10
 The Police Authority for Northern Ireland had key responsibility to secure the 
maintenance of an efficient and effective police service. It held the Chief Constable to 
account for his actions in certain areas (e.g. objectives, performance targets, and 
budgets). A new Policing Board replaced it in November 2001. 
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therefore counts as four intimidations or exiles although only, in effect, one family 
member may have been intimidated or told to leave the area by a paramilitary group.  
 
FAIT also experienced internal divisions that resulted in questions being asked about 
the group’s credibility (Oldham 1998; Clarke 1998). For example, Vincent McKenna, 
a self-proclaimed former member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
who became the group’s development officer, named publicly two individuals 
allegedly involved in the Omagh bombing
11
 at the UK Unionist Party’s annual 
conference (Murphy 1999; Fergus 1999). A short while later McKenna left FAIT and 
formed a new human rights group, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Bureau in May 
1999. The reliability and validity of the figures gathered by the Bureau have been 
questioned by the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of 
Offenders
12
 (Campbell 1999) as has the credibility of the organisation following 
reports that McKenna had been investigated in connection with child sex abuse 
allegations. McKenna claimed the PIRA was waging a campaign of intimidation 
against him, including two bomb attacks at his home and the vilification of his 
character by accusations of child sex abuse. However, McKenna was later arrested 
and found guilty of 32 charges of sexually abusing his daughter in the Republic of 
Ireland and received a three year custodial sentence (Harper 2000). The overall 
credibility of an organisation affects the credibility of their ‘numbers’. As a 
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 The Omagh bombing of 1998 was the worst terrorist atrocity in Northern Ireland’s 
bloody history where 29 innocent civilians were killed in a busy rural town centre. 
12
 The Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders is a 
voluntary organisation operating in the field of criminal justice which is part-funded 
by government sources. 
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consequence of the controversy surrounding FAIT, the research team used official 
PSNI statistics alongside developing its own comprehensive database compiled from 
daily newspaper reports of paramilitary attacks. The database was subsequently used 
to analyse the frequency, nature and geographical concentration of attacks over a two-
year period using GIS mapping techniques. It also acted as a source of qualitative 
data, in that each incident recorded brief details of the attack/assault. 
 
During the research project, the best known pressure/support groups in this area of 
violence, FAIT and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Bureau, lost credibility. Yet 
the information they generated played a key role in the public debate on the issue. The 
Conservative Party, for example, drew heavily in a House of Commons debate on 
information provided by FAIT. This was at a juncture in the Belfast Agreement when 
the early release of paramilitary prisoners was the focus of heated discussion. The 
Conservative Party spokesperson on Northern Ireland (Andrew MacKay) set the scene 
for the debate on 
 
mutilations, torture and beatings by giving some statistics that have been 
prepared by Families Against Intimidation and Terror, a non-sectarian 
organisation that is doing marvellous work to help the victims of such 
mutilations and beatings, giving them hope, succour and, at times, protection 
and, sadly, at other times spiriting them out of the country to safety…FAIT has 
more accurate and up-to-date figures, than, sadly, the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
can possibly have. 
(MacKay 1999) 
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This illustrates how the multiple layers of ‘counting’ and recording violence are 
ignored in a partisan political agenda. The credibility of statistics gathered by self-
appointed spokespeople may be enhanced through publicity in official (Hansard) and 
media sources. 
 
Like Northern Ireland, South Africa collates crime statistics. Unfortunately, the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) does not maintain separate records for vigilante 
attacks, therefore no official statistics are available. Even if these statistics were 
available it is unlikely that they would be valid and reliable. As the Institute of 
Security Studies notes ‘crime statistics are usually regarded with caution: in South 
Africa they are treated with outright scepticism’ (Louw 1998: 11). A Committee of 
Inquiry into the Collection, Processing and Publication of Crime Statistics was 
appointed in May 1997 by the Minister of Safety and Security and found that there 
was an absence of an ‘information culture’ within the SAPS, which highlights the 
problems affecting crime statistics. They found, for example, that many SAPS 
officials did not make optimal use of crime statistics in their daily policing activities, 
which in turn affected data input and the quality of the output statistics accordingly. 
Furthermore, there was insufficient training, a high turnover of skilled personnel and 
inadequate physical and human resources (Louw 1998). In light of these findings the 
Minister placed a year-long moratorium (June 2000 - June 2001) on the release of 
crime statistics on the grounds they were unreliable and inaccurate. Critics suggest 
that the ban had more to do with masking rising levels of violent crime and the 
government’s poor performance in fighting crime.  
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Clearly with the absence of national crime statistics it is difficult to assess the scale of 
vigilante attacks in South Africa. Having said this, a small amount of information has 
been compiled by the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The HRC is an independent 
human rights non-governmental organisation that has been monitoring and reporting 
on human rights abuses and political violence in South Africa since 1988. In its 
monthly publication Human Rights Report instances of vigilante attacks were detailed 
in the Political Rights section. These data, although providing some information, are 
not a comprehensive survey of vigilante activities. In addition the Report is no longer 
published. 
 
Given the nature of the crimes under review here, it is impossible to obtain accurate 
data on the scale of the problem. Official sources under-estimate the level of 
paramilitary/vigilante crime because of victims’ fears of reporting incidents to the 
police (in the case of Northern Ireland) or systemic data collection problems which 
provide a useful excuse for politicians embarrassed by lawlessness (in the case of 
South Africa). When this is overlaid with an overt political agenda to discredit, for 
example, the outworking of the Belfast Agreement or to criticise the ANC 
Government, there is no incentive for state bodies (police or criminal justice) to 
improve the quality of their data and provide their opponents with information to use 
against them. 
 
Speaking with victims of violence 
One major difficulty in the present study was securing access to those who have been 
subjected to paramilitary ‘punishment’ or vigilante attacks. Making contact with 
community organisations with which the researchers had previous experience seemed 
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a useful starting point. Whilst community workers knew victims of such attacks, their 
role in brokering contact met with limited success. What became clear during the 
course of this work in Northern Ireland were the contradictions within communities. 
The very same community organisations may have intentionally or unintentionally 
referred victims to paramilitaries. It should not have been too surprising therefore that 
‘punishment’ victims felt unwilling to co-operate with community organisations they 
suspected of ‘running to paramilitaries’ about them. This was not wholly 
unproductive, we did interview, for example, a father and son who had been beaten in 
a mistaken identity case and other community volunteers/workers who had 
themselves been beaten or shot. 
 
A typical account given by a victim illustrates the sensitivity of the topic: 
 
I was walking down the road and I heard a screech of brakes and I looked 
behind me, and I knew right away because of the big figures in the car. So I 
tried to run down an entry (alley) way and they ran on down the front of the 
street and got to the bottom of the entry before I had. I ran into them and they 
hit me a punch and I went on my back and they just pointed the gun at me and 
told me to lie there. Well they didn’t shoot me there, they took me away in a 
car…to the area I lived in. They took me into a house there, I was tied up, put a 
hood over my head and I was made to stand facing the wall. I asked could I sit 
down and there was no answer so I was going to try and sit down myself. I tried 
to get down like that and they just laid in and booted me all over the fucking 
show and pulled me back up onto my feet. They took me out, made me wait for 
another wee short while in the entry way, brought me out onto a wee grass 
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verge, told me to lie down and kneecapped me. After a couple of weeks I got 
out of hospital and went home. Two days after I got out of hospital they came to 
the door and said “you’ve got ‘til 12 o’clock the next day to get out of the 
country”.  
(Interview with victim of ‘punishment’ shooting, December 1999). 
 
Other problems arose even if victims agreed to talk to us. Some interviewees 
expressed concern over who might see interview transcripts. For example, one victim 
who had received three ‘punishment’ beatings and been told to leave his local area 
said ‘I’m scared. I don’t know what to say, or who’s going to hear it. I’m scared in 
case anybody hears it and knows [my story]’. We assured our interviewees that the 
audio tapes would be wiped and the interview transcripts anonymised and kept in a 
secure location. This was not always convincing to interviewees nervous about their 
security, despite their willingness to participate. In some cases we knew victims’ 
obvious reluctance to reveal stories in too much detail. 
 
When access was proving particularly difficult and slow, however, one suggestion 
was to visit victims admitted to hospital for injuries resulting from paramilitary 
‘punishment’ attacks, the researcher’s equivalent of ambulance chasing. Media 
coverage of these incidents often carried footage of victims in hospital beds. Whilst 
this had the clear potential to raise awareness of the horrific nature of these incidents 
on a scale beyond the capacity of our research, there was also the danger of 
sensationalism. Our own predisposition was therefore to reject this possibility for 
access, on the grounds that it could exacerbate the victim’s distress recounting the 
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incident so soon after the event, and we suspected payments were made for the 
interviews which may have influenced the motivations of the respondents
13
.  
 
The most productive source of access, however, proved to be via the Probation Board 
for Northern Ireland, an executive non-departmental public body whose aim is to help 
prevent re-offending. Their day-to-day business brought them into contact with young 
people, a number of whom had been ‘disciplined’ by the paramilitaries for ‘anti-social 
behaviour’. Support for the research was secured at the senior level of the 
organisation and a letter of endorsement sent to area probation managers. Thereafter, 
the researchers made contact with local probation officers for referrals. Their 
professional interest in the topic and access to a ‘captive’ client base proved fruitful. 
A number of probation officers had to deal with the consequences of paramilitary 
violence for young people and were keen to assist with research that could help to 
address its causes. Their brokerage role also carried certain credibility and cultivated 
trust with those willing to be interviewed which would have been difficult for us as 
researchers to secure. 
 
Gaining access to victims in South Africa also proved difficult. To this end an 
informal working relationship was entered into with the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), a Johannesburg-based non-governmental 
organisation. CSVR were engaged in a programme of research examining the nature 
and extent of violence during South Africa’s transition from apartheid rule to 
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 We deliberated over payments-for-access in our project and decided to reimburse 
interviewees at a standard rate for expenses incurred in attending, such as travel costs, 
child-minding fees and lost earnings. 
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democracy. One strand of this research focused on revenge violence and vigilantism. 
Even with this relationship only six interviews were secured with individuals who had 
been victims of vigilantism. This may in part be explained by reluctance on behalf of 
victims to come forward through fear of further attacks. Indeed there have been cases 
of community members paying the bail of alleged criminals so that they are released 
from police custody into the community and subsequently killed. One interviewee 
who was abducted from his home by a crowd of 50 community members and taken to 
a local school hall to appear before a kangaroo court explains: 
 
The fact of the matter is you either plead guilty or not guilty and then if you 
plead not guilty you are not given the opportunity to state why you are pleading 
not guilty. And they say “but you did this” and whilst you are busy trying to 
explain something, somebody will come from nowhere and start slapping you 
and saying “but tell the truth”. So there is a lot of intimidation, harassment and 
complete abuse of your personal dignity and esteem so that you end up 
cowering in a corner. The guys have guns, AK-47s, sjamboks, knobkieries, 
pangas
14
. You are defenceless in that type of situation. You are completely at 
their mercy. 
 (Interview with victim of vigilantism, October 1999). 
 
The brokerage roles of organisations with which victims have had prior contact and 
where a relationship of trust had been established, help in gaining access. The 
credibility of intermediary bodies, not seen as organs of the state, was of prime 
                                                          
14
 Sjamboks are whip like implements, knobkieries are wooden sticks and pangas are 
large knives. 
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importance. When the state itself is integral to the nature of the conflict and its various 
manifestations such as communal violence, these pre-requisites are all the more 
significant. Given the problems of accessing victims, the forty interviewees in the 
research emerged through a process of snowball sampling, intermediary agencies and 
personal contacts with community organisations. This is clearly a non-probability 
sample and it is legitimate to question the quality of data arising from this 
methodological approach. The research did, however, triangulate victims’ stories 
through focus group work within communities, interviews with statutory and 
voluntary bodies dealing with paramilitary/vigilante violence, feedback from political 
parties and secondary data sources (newspapers, periodicals and community-based 
newsheets). The nature of the attacks, the interrogation processes and the violence 
used were independently repeated in the accounts of a number of the interviewees. An 
‘ideal-type’ sampling framework simply isn’t available to researchers in areas of high 
sensitivity – being mindful of the consequences of using alternative strategies on data 
quality and finding ways to validate findings are essential in these circumstances. 
 
Personal security of researchers studying political violence 
The personal security risks associated with this type of research are high. Lee (1993), 
referring to Yancey and Rainwater (1970), described two kinds of danger that may 
arise during the research process: the ‘presentational’ and the ‘anonymous’. The 
former occurs when the researcher’s presence or actions evoke aggression, hostility or 
violence within the setting. The latter, when the researcher is exposed to otherwise 
avoidable danger, simply because of the dangerous research environment. Both kinds 
of dangers apply to studying paramilitary violence and vigilantism. Paramilitaries in 
Northern Ireland are well practised in dealing with ‘touts’ or those passing 
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information, alleged or otherwise, to the PSNI. This extends to those ‘speaking out’ 
against them. Suspected informers are shot, there are no exemption clauses for 
academic researchers. For example, a former member of the PIRA, Eamon Collins, 
was murdered in January 1999 following his evidence against former PIRA 
colleagues in court and a book, revealing their operations and depicting its members 
as ‘a sadistic conspiracy of ageing, pot-bellied drink-induced egos’. Likewise in South 
Africa, University of Cape Town academic Dr Ebrahim Moosa had his home bombed 
after criticising the vigilante activities of PAGAD. Of more direct relevance to this 
research was the attempted assassination of Queen’s University Belfast Professor of 
Comparative Politics, Adrian Guelke, in September 1991. The Ulster Freedom 
Fighters (UFF)
15
 broke into his home and shot him in the side but failed to kill him 
because their guns jammed. The terrorists claimed that he was an intelligence officer 
for the IRA and involved in importing arms from the Middle East. It subsequently 
transpired from a journalist’s investigation that Professor Guelke’s South African 
background and research on violence therein, had led to loyalist paramilitaries being 
approached. He was, he suspects, set up by an outsider. Guelke explained: 
 How or why I fell foul of some person in South Africa to the extent that I 
became a target for assassination, I do not know. Perhaps my writing about 
South Africa’s supply of arms to Loyalist paramilitary organisations gave 
offence, or a brief investigation I carried out into extreme right-wing violence 
in South Africa may have been the cause. There were a number of 
possibilities. From my experience of Northern Ireland I know how utterly 
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 The UFF is a loyalist paramilitary organisation and a cover name used by the Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA) to claim sectarian killings. 
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trivial the reasons someone becomes a target can be. In general, campaigns of 
violence are rarely conducted with precision, whatever their ultimate purpose. 
(Guelke 1998: 196) 
Guelke’s first hand experience provides an ominous warning against complacency in 
undertaking fieldwork into paramilitary violence. A surveillance network operates on 
behalf of the paramilitaries tasked with ‘keeping their eyes open’ for unusual activity. 
As a precautionary measure we ‘informed’ political representatives of the 
paramilitaries (Sinn Féin, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic 
Party) about our research so that they were aware of its authenticity. In essence this 
amounted to securing their ‘approval’ in the event of questions being asked about its 
precise purpose. A key aspect of convincing the political representatives of our bona 
fides was the source of funding for the research. Had the research received 
government funding, particularly from the Northern Ireland Office
16
, 
political/paramilitary ‘endorsement’ for the fieldwork would have been impossible. 
Researchers would be seen by republicans, for example, as part of the ‘British 
establishment’ and therefore, by definition, engaged in intelligence gathering under 
the guise of academic research. This would undoubtedly have put us at risk in 
undertaking fieldwork on such a sensitive topic. The fact that the research had been 
funded through the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) attributed 
significant independence to our motives and we offered this information to 
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 The Northern Ireland Office is the department of the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland which remains responsible for matters not devolved to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. These include matters such as policing, security policy, prisons, criminal 
justice, international relations and taxation. 
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participants as part of negotiating access. Suspicion of the researchers’ motives may 
not arise solely from paramilitaries. The security forces may have concerns about 
researchers (without a police record) being spies on behalf of paramilitary 
organisations.  
In South Africa, we sought the support of respected community members in the 
townships we wished to study. These local residents provided invaluable assistance 
with our fieldwork, not only acting as guides and ‘gatekeepers’ but also as ‘sponsors’ 
thereby ensuring safe passage in the townships. In most cases, ‘gatekeepers’ arranged 
to meet us at the edge of the township and travelled with us in the car. Meetings and 
interviews were held during the day, thus travelling to and from the townships in 
darkness was avoided. 
Suspicion of ‘outsiders’ is intense in this type of research. In Northern Ireland, the 
perceived religion of the researcher is likely to be a key factor in the minds of 
interviewees. Respondents look for ‘clues’ to religious affiliation that has become 
intrinsic to social interaction in Northern Ireland. The most obvious, although not fail-
safe, is the researcher’s name. Beyond that, area of residence, birthplace, 
accent/language, appearance, school attended, interest in particular sports and, 
somewhat bizarrely, whether one is ‘Catholic or Protestant-looking’. Coming from the 
‘other’ community may condition the response of interviewees or put the researcher at 
some risk given the sensitive topic under review and the nature of the questions 
posed. In South Africa, this was less of a consideration given that we were non-South 
African researchers interested in a South African phenomenon. To understand 
paramilitary ‘policing’ in Northern Ireland or vigilantism in South Africa requires 
probing questions about motives, methods, support for paramilitaries’/vigilante 
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actions within their communities, and the exploration of alternative ways of dealing 
with ‘anti-social behaviour’. To the suspicious interviewee this may smack of 
information gathering reinforced by our preference to tape-record the interview for 
the purposes of data analysis. For the interviewer in these circumstances, Lee 
contends that ‘complete neutrality is probably impossible’ and when researchers 
proclaim their neutrality ‘they are, in fact, concealing their own sympathies’ (Lee 
1995: 23). This is a difficult and sometimes dangerous balancing act. 
It is only sensible in undertaking fieldwork to observe cautious security protocol.  
Being aware of the constituency in which one is interviewing is crucial - staunchly 
loyalist and republican enclaves are dotted throughout most towns/cities in Northern 
Ireland while South African townships tend to be on the fringes of urban areas. 
Sensible security planning can involve working out entry and exit routes, opting, 
where possible, for safe(ish) locations to conduct interviews (for example, 
administrative headquarters of political parties linked to paramilitaries and the offices 
of non-governmental organisations), taking taxis to venues as opposed to using 
personal transport with car registration details, doing fieldwork in pairs, informing 
other members of the research team of your schedule. The venue for conducting 
interviews is particularly important. Participants and researchers must feel safe. There 
are areas in Northern Ireland, for example, where one community or the other feels 
threatened, given the territorial nature of segregated space. Finding ‘neutral’ venues 
isn’t always easy and hence the use of Probation Board offices, where a number of the 
interviewees had official appointments, provided secure settings. Whilst highlighting 
the importance of sensible personal security measures, these must be kept in 
perspective. Here we concur with Punch, that researchers of controversial topics must 
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not ‘become over-sensitive so as to avoid dubbing the setting or topic virtually 
unresearchable’ (Punch 1989: 181). 
 
Feeding back findings: Dissemination and engagement with stakeholders 
Our final heading concerns the dissemination of the research findings and the extent 
to which one engages with stakeholders. One month prior to the release of the 
findings, separate seminars were held in two of the four focus group areas (one in a 
republican area and the other in a loyalist area). The research team considered it 
important to give something back to participants in the project and to the communities 
studied. In both seminars the findings of the research were well received. A findings 
leaflet was produced and sent to everyone who had participated in the research 
(copies of the leaflet were sent to Probation Board officers to pass on to those 
individuals who had been referred to us) and to other interested parties. The project 
website also contained a summary of the research and its findings. 
 
We did not anticipate how the media would portray the findings. Their reaction was 
generally supportive of the research but honed in on criticism levelled at the Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO) with headline items such as ‘NIO slammed over punishment 
attacks’ and ‘NIO lacking courage on thug menace’. The NIO reacted angrily and 
denied it was ‘indifferent’ to paramilitary attacks and refused to ‘comment in detail on 
a report officials were not given the opportunity to see before publication’ (Graham 
2000: 7). This raises the interesting question as to whether organisations, particularly 
those which have been criticised in research, should be afforded a prior ‘right to 
reply’. If so, how should this feature in the findings and dissemination process, or 
how might this be anticipated in advance to give the organisation time to prepare their 
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‘press release’? Furthermore the NIO stated ‘What we have seen amounts to a series 
of unsubstantiated, generalised and politically tendentious assertions’ (Irish News 
2000: 5). What they had ‘seen’ at the time of issuing this statement were newspaper 
accounts of the research and not the final report. In fact, the NIO were interviewed as 
part of the research and the project team also briefed the NIO on ‘punishment’ attacks 
prior to a debate on the topic in the House of Commons. In addition, a NIO official 
attended a research seminar where preliminary findings were presented. 
 
The Northern Ireland Office’s response may have been conditioned by their 
anticipation of how the research could/would be used in the wider political context. 
Politicians drew selectively on the research to condemn the government and its 
response (or lack thereof) to the informal criminal justice system. Such was the extent 
of this public discourse that the report was debated on the floor of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. The motion put to the Assembly was: 
 
The Assembly notes with grave concern the contents of the ‘Informal Criminal 
Justice Systems in Northern Ireland’ report on punishment beatings by 
paramilitary organisations; deplores and condemns the Government’s 
inadequate response to the report; and calls on the Government to bring forward 
measures to ensure that those responsible are made amenable to the law.  
(Northern Ireland Assembly 2001a) 
 
The debate itself highlighted the politicisation of the research findings in which some 
members of the legislative assembly used the criticisms levelled at the NIO over the 
issue as a blanket condemnation of the outworking of the Belfast Agreement. One 
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contributor argued that the research report ‘has presented cogent evidence that the 
Good Friday Agreement is failing’ (Northern Ireland Assembly 2001b: 47). This 
enormous extrapolation from a research report which dealt with a single (but 
significant) issue of criminal justice to a declaration that the Belfast Agreement had 
failed demonstrates the way in which the findings were manipulated for political 
purposes. The motion was passed on a strictly partisan vote – the Ulster Unionists, 
Democratic Unionists and Alliance parties voted in favour; Sinn Féin, the Progressive 
Unionist Party (PUP) and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition voted against; and 
the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) abstained. The findings of the 
research assumed a degree of political import never intended or anticipated by the 
researchers. The timing of the report, when the Northern Ireland Assembly still was 
still faltering, may have been unfortunate in that pro- and anti- Belfast Agreement 
parties attempted to seize the initiative over any issue in which there was political 
capital. This volatile political milieu would have been difficult to predict and take into 
account in the dissemination of the research. 
 
Conclusion 
Two broad methodological themes are considered in the conclusion to this chapter, 
first data inputs and outputs in the form of valid and reliable information sources, 
their translation into research findings and dissemination, and second the specific 
concerns of access and security in conducting fieldwork. In a comparative research 
project of this type the political context is an important and influencing factor on the 
data sources available. In South Africa and Northern Ireland, the state and its organs 
are protagonists in the conflict and hence ‘official’ sources of data may not represent 
an accurate picture of the problem. This may be for reasons that the state is not 
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perceived as a neutral arbiter and hence there is under-reporting by victims of 
communal violence or that the state attempts to suppress information which would 
reveal its poor stewardship. Either way, official statistics are not, in themselves, 
reliable and valid sources of information. When looking for alternatives, however, 
researchers need to be aware that pressure groups, by definition, have their own 
agenda and hence information emanating from these sources may be tendentious. The 
‘politics’ of information is not only apparent at the research input stage but also 
relevant for outputs or at the point of presenting findings and their dissemination. This 
research took on a life of its own beyond the formal presentations of its findings. One 
reflective question is the extent to which this process can or should be managed so 
that political spinning is minimised. Project data had to rely largely on quantitative 
reporting from official sources, and the development of our own databases expanded 
on the detail of each paramilitary assault. The problem of under-reporting remains 
however, and is a more fundamental issue associated with fear of 
paramilitary/vigilante reprisal and lack of confidence in the security forces. 
 
In terms of the fieldwork, this chapter draws attention to two specific issues, access 
and security. In the former, the time taken to establish contacts, convince them of the 
bona fides of the researchers, and gain access to victims took much longer than 
anticipated. When brokering organisations or community groups are used to secure 
access, they too have baggage as gatekeepers which researchers must be aware of in 
terms of the interviewees they assist with. Once access was secured the key problems 
encountered were suspicion of the researchers’ motives, how the information would 
be utilised and, importantly, who would have access and how it would be stored. In a 
highly sensitive research topic these are not unusual methodological concerns. 
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Perhaps more unexpectedly for the research team was the potential to re-traumatise 
interviewees in the course of retelling their stories and possible repercussions of their 
own exposure to highly distressing accounts of brutal and violent incidents. In one 
incident the victim of a particularly brutal paramilitary beating became highly 
emotional in recounting the incident. He had spoken during the course of the 
interview of his anger at the attack on him, concern at the disfigurement to his limbs 
and extreme nervousness about the potential for future paramilitary attacks. In his 
heightened state of anxiety he dropped his trousers to authenticate the injuries 
sustained to his legs and broke down in a state of emotional distress. As researchers, 
perhaps naively, we were unprepared and untrained in dealing with the minor number 
of cases presenting with symptoms of psychological anguish. Although conducting 
research in two volatile contexts such as Northern Ireland and South Africa presents 
obvious dangers, our experience was that with sensible precautions and an acute 
awareness of the political sensitivities, prior planning and attention to potential 
problems minimised the risk. 
 
A key consideration for this research was the policy implications of its findings. Since 
those ultimately charged with implementing policy recommendations (the Northern 
Ireland Office) were the focus of criticism within the research, this presented 
difficulties. Ultimately this is a balancing act in convincing key stakeholders that the 
criticism levelled is constructive and trying to gain their ownership of, and 
endorsement for, changes recommended. Sensationalist press reporting did not help in 
the pursuit of this goal. 
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